The connexionnist nature of modern financial markets. Challenges and possible outcomes by Huault, Isabelle & Rainelli-Le Montagner, Hélène
The connexionnist nature of modern financial markets.
Challenges and possible outcomes
Isabelle Huault, He´le`ne Rainelli-Le Montagner
To cite this version:
Isabelle Huault, He´le`ne Rainelli-Le Montagner. The connexionnist nature of modern financial




Submitted on 29 Jul 2010
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 1 
The connexionist nature of modern financial markets 
Challenges and possible outcomes 
 
Isabelle Huault, Université Paris Dauphine 
Isabelle.huault@dauphine.fr 
 






The recent financial crisis has triggered radical criticism against financial markets. In this 
paper, we propose to analyse this criticism in the perspective drawn by Boltanski and 
Thevenot (1991/2006) around the notion of justification. We see the main debate as opposing 
the critics and the defenders of what can be identified as a Market order (Boltanski and 
Thevenot, 1991/2006). While the former regret the consequences of deregulation in financial 
markets, the latter insist on the preservation of regulatory options favouring market activity 
as much as possible.  
This debate however relies on the hypothesis that financial markets in general fit the ideal-
type of the Walrasian market model. While this hypothesis might make sense as regards the 
description of stock markets (this refers to the so called market efficiency issue), it appears 
unrealistic when applied to the majority of modern financial markets. At least 80% of those 
are OTC markets where bilateral contracts are exchanged between counterparties in the 
absence of any centralized structure.  
Our thesis is that to be useful, a critical perspective on financial markets should take full 
account of the nature of OTC markets, which guarantees neither the transparency of prices 
nor the efficiency of competition mechanisms. We propose to characterize this nature using 
Boltanski and Chiapello’s concept (1999/2008) of the Connexionnist World. We then 
emphasize the difficulty of the connexionnist grammar of worth to develop principles of 
justice in OTC markets, which are characterized by their despatialization and the infinity of 
potential members. We suggest potential tracks to struggle more efficiently against the drifts 
of the connexionnist logic as they arise on financial markets and their spillover effects on 
societies. 






The financial crisis that began in the summer of 2007, and was accelerated in September 2008 
by the failure of Lehman Brothers, has brought fierce and multifaceted criticism down on the 
financial markets. At the risk of being too schematic, we recognise that the debate is 
essentially divided into two distinct camps. The first condemns the ability of the markets to 
circulate vast capital sums with no geographical limits and thus their ability to create 
damaging competition, pitting everyone against everyone else (Arnoldi, 2004; Bryan and 
Rafferty, 2006; LiPuma and Lee, 2004, 2005; Maurer, 2002; Pryke and Allen, 2000; Tickell, 
1998) to the detriment of industrial investment and economic stability. The second is opposed 
to any regulation that would limit freedom of action. This is seen as detrimental because it 
reduces market activity, prevents the establishment of a fair price in financial deals, and raises 
the cost of financing businesses and households. This analysis, which is favoured by the 
promoters of financial innovations, is obviously not free from self-interest. However, what 
interests us primarily is that it is based on a Walrasian conception of markets (where purely 
competitive markets produce perfect price transparency), which poorly fits the reality of 
modern financial markets (which are mostly OTC markets involving non transparent bilateral 
transactions). The aim of this article is to take full account of this mismatch, lift the veil on 
the characteristic nature of current financial markets, and think afresh about the challenges 
posed by the financial system as it stands at present. Our argument is based on the idea that 
modern financial markets, in their over-the-counter (OTC) shape, derive from a new capitalist 
logic: the connexionist logic (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999/2005). Identifying the values 
system and characteristics of this logic reveals the distance between the rhetoric of 
justification used by supporters of the markets and the true mechanisms at stake. It provides 
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paths for solutions to the dysfunctional processes observed on OTC markets.   
  
 The promotion of the activity of financial markets refers us back to a theoretical 
framework known as the efficient-market hypothesis (EMH) (Fama 1970, 1991). EMH posits 
that the ability to buy and sell without hindrance allows information on fundamentals held by 
one party or another to integrate the prices of financial securities quickly and efficiently. Free 
competition between security issuers and investors thus allows the price to reflect the “true” 
and “fair” value of securities (Carruthers and Stinchombe, 1999) at any given moment. This 
vision of how financial markets function takes as its ideal the Walrasian model of the perfect 
market, where the bids and offers of individual agents, each with full access to the available 
information, are directed to an auctioneer who works out the price and then announces it to 
traders. It provides theoretical foundations for regulatory options favouring market activity, or 
hindering it as little as possible.  
Without engaging in the debate about the ability of the efficient-market theory to describe the 
proper functioning of stock markets, we note that most modern financial markets obviously 
do not fit the Walrasian description. From statistics about world financial markets produced 
by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) we can state that in December 2008 these 
were made up in notional volumei of 80% of OTC derivatives markets, stock markets 
properly speaking comprising only 5% of international financial markets. In the absence of 
detailed statistics relating to the nature of the debt market (whether standardized or OTC) it is 
not possible, with the figures supplied by the BIS, to quantify the exact percentage of the 
international financial markets that operate OTC, but it is appears sensible to estimate that the 
majority of financial transactions occur on such markets. Comprising bilateral transactions 
between two parties, and determined by the placing of private contracts, these “markets” 
allow neither the deal prices, nor the volumes exchanged to be placed in the public domain. 
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We are thus faced with a strange situation, where in order to justify largely unrestrictive 
regulations, the supporters of financial markets and financial innovations seem to project the 
idealised image of the Walrasian market onto the OTC markets, which obviously do not fit 
the description. The argument most often made to justify this apparent contradiction is that 
exchange through a private market is a necessary step for financial innovations that, once 
widely accepted and used, will be called upon to join more transparent and competitive 
markets. In any case, regulation should not inhibit business activity because one expected 
development is progressive homogenization of traded products, resulting in greater liquidity 
and eventually more efficient competition among those who supply and demand these 
products. 
Adopting a historical perspective on developments in modern finance however, offers very 
little in favour of the actuality of the process that might lead the OTC markets towards the 
model of quasi-Walrasian markets. Since the establishment of options and futures markets in 
their modern form in the 1970s in the EU and the 1980s in Europe, options and futures traded 
on standardized markets represent a mere 3% of the total of the derivatives market. All the 
financial innovations that arose on OTC markets have stayed there. The market for interest 
rate swaps for example, which constitutes 54% of the entire market in derivate products, is 
typically an OTC market. The recent crisis experienced by credit derivatives has induced 
regulators to try to set up clearing houses and to bring their way of functioning closer to that 
of the organized markets. The apparent slowness with which this change is being 
accomplished, and the resistance of the parties involved, shows that the process, still very 
tentative, is neither easy nor natural. 
These observations lead us to reject the argument that the OTC model will be only a passing 
phenomenon on modern financial markets, and to form the hypothesis that OTC markets are 
different in nature from standardized markets. If participants in financial markets have shown 
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a preference for this kind of market for more than two decades, it is not by chance nor is it 
likely to be of brief duration. It is more likely that this kind of market fulfils a particular 
function that needs to be identified and defined. Some elucidation therefore seems necessary 
to distinguish and re-evaluate the mechanisms that regulate these new-style markets and that 
might prove to be dysfunctional. This will be a starting point for a renewed and more in-depth 
criticism of the way the current financial system functions. 
To contribute to this renewed criticism, we propose to use the theoretical frameworks 
provided by Boltanski and Thevenot (1991/2006) and Boltanski and Chiapello (1999/2005). 
We shall try to establish that modern financial markets of the OTC model, far from belonging 
to the market order described by Boltanski and Thevenot, seem to follow a new capitalist 
logic – the connexionist logic (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999/2005). In the first part of this 
paper, we endeavour to describe OTC markets from this point of view. This enables us to 
consider the changes in the critique required once the connexionist nature of OTC markets has 
been identified. The challenges they present in the financial sphere, to the economy as a 
whole, and to society at large are reassessed in the second part of the paper. 
 
1 From the Walrasian ideal to modern financial markets 
 
Boltanski and Thévenot (1991/2006) identify and describe six worlds corresponding to six 
grammars of worth within which individuals move around, calling on the scales of one world 
or another when they need to justify themselves in cases of discord, which are inevitable once 
individuals are obliged to organise themselves within the framework of collective action. For 
Boltanski and Thevenot, each “world” constitutes a specific justification regime, characterised 
by a higher common principle that is called upon whenever there is conflict within one world 
or between worlds. The world of inspiration, whose higher common principle is the 
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flourishing of inspiration and illumination, is opposed to the domestic world, which is 
governed by the principle of place in the ordering of generations, tradition and hierarchy. The 
world of fame is subjected to the law of reputation; the dominant value in the civic world is 
the pre-eminence of the collective; and in the industrial world, the highest principle is 
efficiency. The market world’s higher common principle is competition, where rivalry and 
competitiveness are seen as positive values.  
Among these six worlds we are most interested in the market world, which seems to offer a 
renewed characterisation of the Walrasian ideal of efficient markets.  
 
1.1 Stock markets, OTC markets and the “market order” 
The market world described by Boltanski and Thévenot (1991/2006: 252) is characterised by 
three main traits. The first concerns the nature of relationships between individuals. These are 
a-temporal, with no past or future and are focused on “objectivised” objects, in the sense that 
neither their definition nor their value depends on the persons involved in the transaction. The 
second characteristic trait concerns the definition of agents, summed up as a client, supplier, 
buyer, seller or competitor, roles that individuals can adopt in turn (Aspers, 2009). Individuals 
in this world are characterized by their detachment from others: they are free and available for 
all kinds of transactions. The third trait specific to the market world allows the precise 
identification of its scale, its grammar of worth and its highest common principle, to be found 
in the predominance of free competition. Although the market world is peopled by individuals 
who are selfish by nature, since through their transactions they pursue the satisfaction of their 
desires, these inhabitants are bound together by a collective value, a scale of worth that is 
measured by the degree of free competition operating in this world. Disputes are resolved by 
establishing the commercial scale of the worth of goods, in other words by price. With 
Boltanski and Thévenot (1991/2006), we note that the seeming homogeneity in goods 
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exchanged in the market world, and the recognition of a price scale, means each transaction 
can be compared to other transactions and equivalences can be established. Although the price 
of a given transaction is the result of negotiations between individuals, there is such a thing as 
a “general price”, a point of reference, something like a true value, a fair price. The existence 
of this fair price depends upon the capacity of numerous agents to buy and sell with no 
hindrance. 
These three characteristics of the market world seem to us a fairly precise description of 
the Walrasian ideal financial market. They also indicate the distance that separates OTC 
markets from this ideal. Namely, up to a certain point the world’s biggest stock exchanges 
appear to be regulated by the basic principles of the market world. The single common good 
recognized by individuals who meet there, is the preservation of the conditions for 
competition between buyers and sellers of stocks, with, as a corollary, the promotion of the 
activity of such exchanges and transparency, which determine the kind of regulation observed 
on these markets.  
In OTC markets however the situation seems to be very different.  First and foremost, 
the question of time scale in derivatives markets is different because contracts can commit 
parties over several months or years, which implies legal and financial risks. Individuals are 
not immediately detached from OTC transactions once they have been concluded. 
Additionally, the objective and homogeneous definition of goods is not as finalised on OTC 
derivatives markets as it is on stock exchanges. One normally distinguishes relatively 
standard products, which are sold at competitive prices, from the sort of bespoke products that 
justify the resort to an OTC market, where sellers can offer their clients products that are 
adapted to their needs. In transactions concerning bespoke products, the specification of the 
product depends, by definition, on the buyer’s expectations and the seller’s capacity to 
respond to them.  
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The question of the interchangeability of agents is also posed in different ways on OTC 
markets and on stock markets. The BIS statistics show that 39% of all the derivatives market 
can be attributed to financial institutions committed to revealing the volume and value of their 
transactions to the central bank in their home country. Fifty per cent of the markets concern 
“other financial institutions” and non-financial agents make up only 11%. Even if the 
financial institutions concerned alternate playing the roles of buyer and seller, the number of 
agents on the OTC markets is lower and we can speculate that not all agents are equal. A 
study carried out on the market for credit derivatives (Huault and Rainelli 2009) showed that 
86% of transactions was carried out by the ten biggest international investment banks in 2007. 
According to the European Central Bank report of April 2009, the situation has worsened 
with the financial crisis: the disappearance of major players in the market (Lehman Brothers, 
Merrill Lynch, Bear Sterns) and certain products (monolines, hedge funds) has once more 
reinforced a concentration that financial authorities judge worrying.  
Finally, the chief characteristic of OTC markets is that they function opaquely. 
Comparing the prices of different sellers in these markets is tricky. It is difficult to establish 
the equivalence of a given transaction because of the heterogeneous nature of the OTC 
contracts, and the absence of any publicity about the volume and price of comparable 
transactions. Transparency – ought to allow optimal allocation of resources on Walrasian type 
markets – seems a distant prospect for OTC markets whose opaqueness, considered a major 
stumbling block in mainstream financial theory, remains high.  
But if OTC markets do not fit the market order described by Boltanski and Thévenot 
(1999/2006), how can we describe the sphere to which they belong? How can we understand 
the values that regulate them, the highest common principle to which agents refer to settle the 
litigation that sets them against each other? What principles do they use as a basis to justify 
market structure when attacked from outside, for example from actors from other Worlds (e.g. 
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the civic world in the case of regulators)? In this paper we attempt to show that OTC markets 
are governed by the sort of connexionist logic described by Boltanski and Chiapello 
(1999/2005).  
 
1.2 OTC markets as connexionist markets  
In their book, Boltanski and Chiapello (1999/2005) describe a reconfiguration of capitalism 
that turns on the notion of networks. While the observation of reticulation phenomena in 
economic exchanges is not in itself new (White, 1992), the authors show the extension of the 
connexionist logic in contemporary capitalism, as characterized by multiple meetings and 
temporary connections that can be set aside and then reactivated at will, over vast 
geographical distances and between extremely diverse groups. They demonstrate that the 
development of this logic is not just a factual evolution in methods of economic exchange but 
is accompanied by the constitution of a veritable “world”. Within this “world”, a value system 
of norms of judgement and principles of equivalence is generated, allowing the definition of 
internal conditions as “worthy” and “unworthy”. More specifically, the notion of project -
serves as the real pivot of this “world”, generating a value scale that organizes the 
relationships between the individuals and things taken up in the connexionist logic. 
Thanks to the multiplication of active connections that it creates, the project creates a space 
for production and accumulation in a mainly liquid world (Baumann, 2005) and generates 
value, justifying the demand to extend the network. For the reticular world, the project 
constitutes the source of a value system that Boltanski and Chiapello name “the projective 
city” and which is driven by a higher principle, the development of a connections network. 
At the heart of this value system is activity, the principle of equivalence by which the 
dimensions of people and things are measured. Activity in this context does not have the 
meaning it has in the industrial world, where it is confused with work, or the market world, 
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where it signifies the number of transactions made. Instead it means the capacity to generate 
projects or to integrate projects generated by others. For those living in this projective city 
environment, it is important never to run short of projects, to know how to pass easily from 
one project to another and to multiply occasions for making projects. Thus connexionist 
beings, the “worthy person” in the projective city, are both physically and intellectually 
available, reactive and mobile. Flexible and multi-tasking, they know how to take risks. They 
can handle ambivalence and are always ready to exploit any opportunities that come their 
way. They are innovators whose creativity springs “more from recombination” (Stark, 1996) 
rather than from radical innovation. Their role is to promote collective innovation, to the 
extent that they would feel awkward about claiming copyright on “their” ideas. On the other 
hand, the “unworthy person” in this city is someone who has difficulty participating in a 
project and then getting out of it, who does not communicate, who does not seem capable of 
compromise and whose ideas appear rigid—someone immobile and inflexible. 
In a world where the main activity is establishing connections, connexionist beings form 
particular relationships with the people they work with. They are not usually hierarchical 
bosses or planners, but “facilitators”, who breathe life and favour self-discipline and 
innovation. They do not take rare goods for their own profit but redistribute them, especially 
information. Their role is to favour the mobility of the individuals they work with. Their 
status as a worthy person requires forms of investment that will lead them to forego stability 
and prefer autonomy to security.  
 
1.2.1 The role of innovation on OTC financial markets 
In the same way that the general project is the means by which the connexionist world 
stabilises forms and generates a system of values, financial innovation, which drives the 
growth of modern financial markets, crystallizes their particular connexionist logic. While the 
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financial innovations of the 1970s (options, futures, index derivatives) were created on 
organised markets (see MacKenzie and Millo, 2003; Millo and MacKenzie, 2009), the great 
majority of new derivatives invented since the 1980s occurred in OTC markets. There, the 
main promoters of innovation have been the world’s big banks, faced with a major evolution 
of financial markets in developed countries moving away from the financial model of debt to 
get closer to a model in which the economy is financed by the markets. When faced with the 
erosion of their margins in traditional credit activities, banks spotted new sources of income 
in financial innovation and new product offerings. They also saw the opportunity to maintain 
their central position in an environment that was being radically transformed. This is how, in 
developed countries, we ended up with a financial system of markets with new intermediaries, 
where the banks play a dominant role in the capital markets through OTC markets, rather than 
a system of direct financing of the economy by the financial markets, which had been the 
initial aim of the reforms of the 1980s. Temporary zones of accumulation, which create new 
sources of value for these agents, are made up of complex financial innovations that generate 
different types of ambiguity. The most interesting of these for those promoting new products 
is the ambiguity surrounding the principles of valuation. In fact, the uncertainty surrounding 
the pertinent measurement of value brings different models of calculation into competition 
and potentially generates margins for the inventors of new products (Beunza and Stark, 2005; 
Lepinay, 2007). The appearance on the markets of products whose definition (see Lepinay, 
2007; Huault and Rainelli, 2009 for example) and valuation generate ambiguities opens up a 
range of opportunities for investors, and the possible extension of the network of connections 
between the agents who handle these complex products (banks, enterprises, energy suppliers, 
fund managers, small shareholders, etc.). 
Thus we can draw a parallel between the role of the project in the reticular markets, described 
by Boltanski and Chiapello (1999/2005), and the role played by innovation in contemporary 
 12 
financial markets. The creation of new products is a temporary source of profitability and not 
just a given of current financial capitalism. It generates an order, a kind of city regulated by a 
value system whose principle of equivalence is the capacity to generate complex financial 
innovations that pit different response mechanisms against a collection of ambiguities, 
especially where the valuation of products is concerned.  
Beunza and Stark (2005) illuminate the nature of this value system by describing the 
organisation of trading rooms, the places where financial institutions make their connections 
and where they exchange their products. They point out that these rooms are a heterarchy 
(Girard and Stark, 2002; Stark, 2009). The relationships between the different members and 
desks are horizontal, not vertical, and nurture knowledge-sharing, as decentralisation is the 
guiding principle. With a flattened organisational hierarchy, no separate offices for 
hierarchical heads, open space design and a collegiate atmosphere, the trading rooms where 
financial products are exchanged these days have a collaborative structure that favours the 
exchange of information and agents’ autonomy. For Beunza and Stark (2005) this kind of 
organisation promotes an entrepreneurial culture that favours innovation. Trading rooms 
organise the coexistence and adjustment of calculations that result from different 
measurement systems. Traders therefore appear like entrepreneurs, as Knight (1921) saw it, 
agents with the capacity to work with coexisting but different evaluation principles. They 
benefit from the ambiguities that arise from this coexistence (Stark, 2000). The trading room 
is organised to promote reflexivity, the ability to define and to recombine resources and 
combinatory innovation (Kogut and Zander, 1992) – in short, to produce new instruments 
containing ambiguities that guarantee the renewal of competitive appraisals of value and the 
recurrent appearance of still-undefined opportunities for arbitrage.  
Today, since the dematerialisation of stock exchanges, the immense majority of financial 
stocks and products are exchanged through the trading rooms of international financial 
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institutions. However, the heterarchical organisation, as described by Beunza and Stark, is 
clearly linked to the higher common principle specific to OTC markets, that is, the infinite 
extensions of networks through rather ambiguous financial innovations.ii Connexionist traders 
have adapted to this form of market. Their stature is defined by the value system generated on 
these markets, which gauges their capacity to generate or favour invention, or by the use of 
complex products that allow the setting up of innovative investment strategies. Their “profile” 
shows the characteristic traits which Boltanski and Chiapello attribute to the connexionist 
being, the “worthy person” in the projective city. Connexionist traders enjoy a certain 
autonomy in relation to the institutions that employ them and do not hesitate to play on the 
competition between potential employers when negotiating a bonus (Godechot, 2007). They 
are willing to change, relocate and move easily between the financial centres where the 
world’s market activities are concentrated (Sassen, 2001). They are never short of a project 
and will readily leave the trading room to set up an entrepreneurial structure or an investment 
fund, because they are motivated by a logic that MacKenzie (2008) describes: “So they’re 
going into it [hedge funds] because they want to run something because they’re never, ever 
going to be the guy that sits right at the top [of an investment bank] because they can’t be 
bothered with the politics [i.e. organisational conflicts and jostling for promotion].” Traders 
are often impatient towards the “unworthy persons” who work in the middle and back office, 
who are not mobile and much less likely to live in an atmosphere of ambivalence, in the 
ambiguity of definitions or actions or explanations, given that they work in more normalised 
cognitive frameworks (accounting, deontology, internal controls). However, traders also 
know how to maintain relationships so that the back office benefits from the results obtained 




1.2.2 The structure of OTC financial markets: connections and networks  
If we understand that, in the network world of OTC markets, financial innovations create 
zones of temporary accumulation of income and also enhancement of reputation for the 
institution where they were first developed, then we can grasp the structure of these markets 
at different levels. The organisation of the trading room is a first level, the most micro-
economic. A wider approach to the organisation set up by the great financial institutions 
allows the identification of a second circle. In OTC markets, exchanges between trading 
rooms take place via complex electronic systems, linking rooms that are geographically far 
apart, in (usually multinational) companies. But the relation between these trading rooms and 
other activities in credit houses or other financial institutions shows some remarkable traits 
(Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 2002). Trading rooms are carefully separated from the rest of the 
company’s activities, not only physically (it is not unusual for access to be restricted) but also 
in the way they are governed. This suggests the organisation of exchanges that can be 
described, in Williamson-like terms, as hybrid, sitting at the frontier between organisations 
and the market. The fact that this organisation combines the characteristics of two forms of 
organisation – the salary model and to the entrepreneur model (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 
2002) – is particularly apparent in the way traders are remunerated, which favours the 
exploitation of connexionist qualities in the people who work on the markets. 
The extension of networks, the highest common principle in the polity we describe here, takes 
on shapes observed elsewhere, for example, interrelations that are very strongly underpinned 
by computing infrastructures – so much so that we can say that the market exists because of 
the intensity of communications between traders. Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, who studied the 
OTC Forex market, propose a definition of the market as a conversation on a global scale 
between the main financial centres of the world. This type of network, as Beunza and Stark 
(2005) noted, is similar to those described by Castells (2000). Thanks to new technologies, 
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they allow highly formatted social interactions with no physical contact; and to exist they 
need to develop more spontaneous, human complementary interactions. This phenomenon 
explains the need to bring the trading rooms of big multinational banks together in 
geographical financial centres (London, New York, Tokyo), hubs where traders can enjoy a 
kind of sociability of the sort described by Sassen (2001), (see also Thrift, 1997; Strange 
1986; Leishon and Thrift 1997).  
 
Finally, at a third level that corresponds to a third perspective of OTC markets, there are 
numerous interconnections between nominally competitive financial institutions. The logic of 
innovation that permeates OTC markets leads to the flourishing of new products marked, as 
we have noted, by a certain number of ambiguities. These ambiguities may be sources of 
profit but they also put the brakes on market development, causing a creative tension that 
obliges agents to cooperate even while competing against each other. The extension of the 
network of agents participating in the new market created around a financial innovation 
requires setting up joint actions by the principal promoters of these innovations, as has been 
clearly shown in the case of the credit derivatives market (Huault and Rainelli, 2009). Here 
the ISDA (Huault and Rainelli, 2009, Morgan, 2008), an association of investment banks and 
other OTC market agents, has taken in hand the question of contract definitions, legal 
qualifications, revision of standards, over a lengthy time span. Certain leaders, such as JP 
Morgan, involved in collaborative actions to promote market liquidity. In the construction 
around innovationsiii phase of the market, and in the consolidation phase (which is still 
incomplete twelve years after the first contracts in the credit derivatives market), cooperation 
between competing agents seems to be one of the ingredients of the development and 
functioning of markets. 
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In their attempt to show the emergence of a new community – the projective city at the 
heart of contemporary capitalism – Boltanski and Chiapello supply descriptors that apply 
most convincingly to OTC financial markets. But beyond highlighting these descriptors and 
their usefulness in characterising the difference between OTC markets and organised financial 
markets (see table 1), the main thing we learn from Boltanski and Chiapello is the revelation 
of the value system that dominates these markets. At the heart of the value system is a 
particular form of project, financial innovation, which, because it is a source of wealth 
creation, organises the relationship between people and objects. The hierarchy that is set up 
between “worthy” and “unworthy” is determined by their capacity to generate, utilise and 
recombine financial innovations. This has given the markets a functioning principle that has 
rarely been seen until now.  
In the rest of this paper, we want to examine the updating of deep roots of action to identify 
the questions about the functioning of these markets that will undoubtedly be asked.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
2. New and fair devices to handle new situations  
 
The value system on which connexionism rests is articulated around the notions of project, 
network and permanent change and has undoubtedly facilitated exponential growth of OTC 
markets and constant innovation. But behind this success lie major dysfunctions, some of 
which were laid bare at the time of the financial crisis. These dysfunctions constitute as great 
a threat for the financial markets themselves as for wider society.  
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More precisely, the race to innovate in derivatives has provoked strong criticism (Arnoldi, 
2004; LiPuma and Lee, 2004, 2005; Maurer, 2002; Pryke, 2007; Pryke & Allen, 2000; 
Tickell, 2008), because derivatives radically transform capitalism and increase unlimited 
competition everywhere (Bryan and Rafferty, 2006), leading to a commodified nightmare 
(Fourcade and Healy, 2007). Bryan and Rafferty (2006) in particular see the continual 
invention of derivative products as an unprecedented way of linking markets, making it 
possible to compare and contrast formerly disparate and heterogeneous securities. With 
investors, managers and banks having the means to instantly compare the performances of 
different types of securities, the race to make profitable investments intensifies. This situation 
is seen by critics as bringing about a disconnection between financial and industrial 
capitalism. The neo-capitalism thus created is by nature essentially financial and speculative, 
free-floating in relation to the real economy. It takes advantage of the mobility of capital and 
disregard long-term investment, preferring immediate maximum profit through ever more 
sophisticated financial innovations. It has the know-how to profit from the worldwide 
networking of the financial world by placing resources in competitive situations, and to 
impose itself as a hyper-power to the detriment of industries and states. Thanks to financial 
innovation and globalisation, the domination of the financial world has been established over 
the industrial world. Others also detect, in the race for financial innovation, the origins of the 
deep instability of the international financial system. The highly mobile and immediately 
negotiable character of sophisticated derivative products, which are likely to be sold on as 
soon as they have been launched, favours opportunism and, in a purely speculative logic, 
creates major financial crises. For example, through the financial innovation of credit 
derivatives, banks transferred risks towards investors who, on the whole, trusted the 
optimistic opinions of credit rating agencies. When the issued securities proved to be toxic an 
extraordinary collapse in confidence followed, resulting in a brutal drying up of the market 
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and general collapse. The almost total disappearance of entire segments of the credit 
derivatives market, like collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), undoubtedly because of their 
OTC structure, threatened the survival of markets characterised by opaque transactions 
centred on very ambiguous products (Huault and Rainelli, 2009). The connexionist logic 
gives rise to a form of specific dysfunction, where opportunism founded on the ability to take 
advantage of information asymmetries can destabilize markets and even threaten their 
existence.  
Because of the recurrence, violence and spillovers of recent financial crises, we currently 
witness the eruption of preoccupations from the Civic World where the “higher principle” 
relates to the notion of the common good, general interest and responsibility. Strikingly, the 
resort to the state – the public agent – when these institutions collapse seems unavoidable. 
During the financial crisis we saw big banks saved by different governments. The rhetorics of 
market activity promoters insisting on self regulation did not work any more and revealed a 
problem of legitimacy. As Boltanski (2009:29) notes, the order referred to in the discourse of 
agents on OTC markets suddenly did not seem to “conform in fact to the values which have 
been adopted in principle” (Boltanski, 2009: 29). Therefore, one question arises: What values 
can be promoted and what practices deployed to bring out a sense of justice in the financial 
system? One of the ways in which this could be done would be by building the projective city 
that is to say, by formulating principles of fairness adjusted to the logic of the real functioning 
of the financial world (2.1). Another way would be to resolve discord with the civic world 
more directly (2.2). 
 
2.1. Forms of justice in the connexionist world: building the projective city?  
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Boltanski and Chiapello (1999/2005) ask whether there are ethical foundations to the 
connexionist logic and what their principles of justice would be? It seems that the “ontology 
of the network has been largely established in such a way to liberate human beings from the 
constraints of justification (…) The network is presented as a plane of immanence – to use 
Gilles Deleuze’s expression- (…). This dispenses with the loops of reflexivity that take the 
form of moral judgement” (Boltanski et Chiapello, 1999/2005: 106-107) It is therefore tricky 
to identify reference to justice specific to the connexionist logic, which is characterised by 
constant de-spatialisation, where very mobile individuals are disinclined to be accountable. 
As the network is open, it modifies itself and it is difficult to determine who participants are. 
“Fairness” in the distribution of status, according to people’s contribution presupposes closing 
the list of the relevant parties, at any given moment. In a completely networked world, no 
such closure is possible. The network is continually extended and altered, with the result that 
there exists no opposite principles for finalizing at a given point in time, the list of those 
between whom scales of justice may be established”. (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999/2005: 
106) 
For example, there is no equivalent here to the solutions for opportunism formulated 
by Abolafia (1996) on the futures market. Any recourse to domestic logic – relying on group 
culture, trust, the strength of community norms, the fear of reprisals – is inoperable because 
the network remains open and individuals are on the move. Traders perfectly incarnate this 
logic. They are flexible, mobile and likely to defect if they are dissatisfied, threatening to 
accept golden handshake packages and move to competing institutions, taking their skills, 
market shares or client portfolios with them, in other words a number of resources that 
together are vaster than the resources linked to their own personal productivity (Godechot, 
2006). 
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We might therefore suggest that the connexionist logic is specific in that it is founded on open 
networks, marked by geographical distances between agents for whom interpersonal links are 
replaced by hypermobility and fluidity (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 2002), all of which act as 
facilitators of opportunism. While small savers see their money immobilised and exposed to 
all the ups and downs of the world economy, thanks to financial innovations, big investors, 
obsessed by the liquidity of markets, have at their disposal stocks that are mobile and 
negotiable at any moment on international markets. “Don’t get stuck” has come to mean stay 
flexible, keep your options open, the mottos of market promoters who see financial 
innovations as a way of mobilising the immobilised (Lordon, 2008: 75) to the detriment of the 
final investment. As Bauman pointed out (2005), those who benefit from the system need 
freedom of movement, non-commitment and liquidity, unlike those whose feet are firmly on 
the ground. 
In the final analysis, the specific traits of connexionist opportunism, which happens in 
a very despatialised universe, authorise liberation from the tests of the domestic world. The 
networked world belongs to an ephemeral aggregate of experiences and interests more than to 
a charter of rights and obligations (Castells, 2000: 264). Any attempt to fix a position in the 
network according to a cultural code would condemn the network to obsolescence: it would 
become too rigid and disappear. 
The other difficulty in identifying principles of justice specific to connexionism arises 
from permanent displacements in capitalism, dismantling the critique that struggles to make 
sense of all these transformations (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999/2005). The creation of 
permanently innovative derivative products makes accounting frameworks and control 
procedures, ineffective even before they can be used (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999/2005: 
509). This extreme mobility destabilises the critique that is already prey to great inertia, 
deeply disoriented and disarmed when it comes to stabilising forms of justice. From this point 
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of view, the distribution of jobs between front and back office in big investment banks reveals 
the power that these mobile and flexible individuals have over those who are immobile. It 
shows the difficulty of establishing formal control structures in OTC markets where there are 
still many remaining uncertainties over the definition, valorisation and standardisation of 
products. Thus, the social capital that employees in the front office enjoy, and the prestige of 
their position, give them the status of “big” players in the connexionist world, allowing them 
to impose their own logic and game rules. Conversely, back office employees give support 
and back up work in an environment where routine and ordinary tasks are the order of the 
day, rather than innovation and the making of extraordinary profits. Traders have the capacity 
to strike up relationships, enter networks, engage in winning transactions and play on the 
ambivalence of accounting, risk taking and moral frameworks. The counterpart to this is the 
immobility of back office employees, who are not paid a great deal and who get little respect 
for their tasks of control, registration and compensation (Godechot, 2006). Normalisation and 
control are stabilised, institutional and codified and as such are characterised by a great inertia 
and by deep immobility, which immediately disqualifies them when they are faced with the 
permanent flexibility of the activities they are supposed to regulate. Thus, the moral 
constraints and internal rules intended to limit the movements of members in the front office 
have little effect on traders who play on the ambiguities of products and markets. Traders are 
miles ahead of their immobile colleagues who remain in fear of being disconnected, are out of 
the game and have been abandoned by their more mobile colleagues (Boltanski and 
Chiapello, 1999/2005). All in all, the mechanisms for controlling opportunism are fatally 
weakened because of their status as “small” players in the connexionist world. Their 
immobility is a prime factor in the creation of profit that the traders make from their mobility 
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999/2005). 
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 However, to counteract loss of trust, which might threaten the very existence of the 
network, some degree of long-term commitment and reciprocal control is required. This might 
provide foundations for the building of a “projective city” in the sense of Boltanski and 
Chiapello (1999/2005).  The project constrains the network to submit itself to a form of 
justice (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999/2005: 107) in at least one direction: the redistribution 
of connections and sharing of information, which will allow network extension and thus 
benefit everybody. 
Concrete devices are needed to make this principle enforceable. One of these is a 
mechanism of identification and “traceability” of people and products. In the case of financial 
markets, this supposes the existence or setting-up of supranational bodies. The extra-territorial 
space towards which the capital markets have tended puts them out of the reach of the nation-
states, which up to now were the only ones capable of supervising them (Bauman, 2005: 190). 
The reform of OTC markets demands the presence of powerful public agents on a worldwide 
scale and a true supranational coordination to build a new form of legal structure. Some 
authors see the drawing up an official status in law as a way of restraining the different forms 
of exploitation carried out by networks (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999/2005: 383). The 
creation of new laws for hybrid forms, like the great interbank networks, could generate 
special norms for protection specific to the network, with the setting up of supranational 
balancing powers that would have legal means of control. This proposition could take the 
form of state-run independent centres, of a “superintendent” or institutions for arbitration 
whose mandate is to preserve the common good (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999/2005: 
304/384). The network would need to be included in the world of the law, “to define the role 
and responsibilities of the constituent units, to establish the rules by which they conduct their 
transactions and to resolve their disputes” (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999/2005:384).  
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 And yet, if we look closely at current developments in the international financial 
system it does not seem that agents are resolutely committed to this path of action. Neither 
does it seem that states have succeeded in convincing them of the need for such arrangements, 
nor that financial operators are aware of the danger of the general collapse of financial 
markets. It seems there is little chance that the connexionist world will self-regulate 
spontaneously, a position that will lead unavoidably to a much more confrontational way of 
handling the discord with the civic world. 
 
2.2 Solving the dispute between connexionist and civic worlds 
 
The theoretical logic of Boltanski and Thévenot would suggest that some forms of agreement 
are needed to reduce the tensions between the increase in criticism and the dispute with the 
civic world. The difficulty of working out solutions within the connexionist world leads to a 
different solution which could take the form of a compromise with the civic world. An 
alternative that might be acceptable to everyone,  could then be to turn to the market world. 
The idea is to combat the imperfections inherent in OTC markets by bringing in more 
standardisation. 
The higher principles of the market world – competition and transparency – are 
weapons with which to tackle the dysfunctions related to connexionism.  For example, the 
proposal to set up clearing houses reflects the desire to combat the opacity and bilateralism of 
CDS contracts. According to Morgan (2010: 16), the main parties in favour “argued that the 
OTC markets had become highly complex and that was needed was a mechanism whereby 
trades between parties could be netted out so that the real exposure (and therefore the real 
risks being held) would be visible.” The challenge could be to encourage standardised 
markets by establishing clearing houses that would be effectively regulated and supervised. 
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The efforts made by various governments to save the world’s financial system seemed 
at first to subscribe to this way of thinking: their main aim was to fight the crisis in market 
liquidity, in particular that of the credit derivatives market and the sub-primes. The notion of 
liquidity is a reflection of the idea that we have of the perfect market where asymmetries of 
information and opportunism are absent. Carruthers and Stinchombe (1999: 353) base their 
analysis on the definition of economists: “By liquidity of a market, economists mean that 
standardized products can be bought and sold continuously at a price that everyone in the 
market can know, and that products are not normally sold at a price that diverges substantially 
from the market price. The idea is that everyone can know at all times what the price is, and 
only one price obtains in the market. Liquidity, like efficiency, is considered one of the great 
virtues of perfectly competitive markets.” Liquidity is the sign of an efficient market, peopled 
with numerous investors and buyers who are in a position to exchange their stocks at 
transparent prices. In financial theory they describe market offers as the ability to sell stocks 
easily, with no institutional intervention, in a laissez-faire context. “Liquid markets being 
good, unliquid markets are bad” (Langley, 2009: 12), we need to get back to more 
transparency. 
However, to work in this way, financial markets need different types of specific 
guarantee (Graham and Richardson, 1997; Picciotto and Mayne, 1999; Sassen, 2005: 31) and 
an enormous amount of work from governments. Carruthers and Stinchcombe (1999) point 
out their reliance on the reduction of transaction costs and the standardisation of securities to 
enable liquidity. In this logic, which is far removed from laissez-faire, as Foucault notes 
(2004: 124), state action encourages competition.  
 But what becomes of this quest for transparency and competition if we accept that the 
very particular nature of OTC financial markets, driven by permanent innovation, makes it 
difficult if not impossible for them to function according to Walrasian criteria? If we accept 
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our hypothesis that OTC markets are not a transitory form of modern financial markets, they 
do not seem destined to join the ranks of the most transparent and competitive. They seem to 
belong to a different species of organised markets, a different logic, a different value system 
and to respond to specific problems. The recourse to the principles of the market world 
presupposes a transformation of OTC markets so radical that it is highly unlikely it would 
ever happen. Some financial operators within ISDA are frightened by current attempts at 
reform because it is not certain that their ultimate interests (in terms of profitability) lie in 
greater transparency, increased standardisation and a total removal of ambiguity. The chief 
lobbyist of the ISDA judges that “excessive standardisation might encourage speculation, it 
doesn’t really contribute anything, while custom made products answer the needs of 
enterprises and investors.”  
 The limits of the power of the market world to help remedy the dysfunctions of the 
connexionnist logic has been well identified by Boltanski and Chiapello (1999/2005). 
“Connexionist opportunism cannot, for one thing, be checked by the commercial city (…). 
Part of the interest of connections stems in fact from the inspection of resources that were not 
regarded as commodifiable or amenable to contracts (…). It is this incompleteness that 
explains the relative inoperability of the constraints that the commercial order rests on ” 
(1999/2005: 378).  
Faced with this difficulty, there is still the possibility of a more radical restructuring 
of the financial system, based on coercion and sanctions. As Bauman (2005: 195) stated, “the 
journeying of economic initiatives to every corner of the planet would not be extravagant nor 
would they be guided only by temporary profit with no heed paid to collateral victims.” 
Partitioning off financial markets might hold back the destructive effects of generalised 
connexionism (Orléan, 2008: 40): the disconnection that follows might prevent savings banks 
from intervening on financial markets and taking risks with the money of small savers. 
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Partitioning and legal barriers effectively raise the costs of doing deals, and create additional 
expense for those managing to overcome these obstacles. 
There are some who recommend a much more drastic limit to the risks taken by banks, 
forbidding the most toxic of financial innovations such as derivative products, “because these 
markets and these products are based on the principle of an incredible accumulation of 
counterpart risks” (Lordon, 2008: 179). 
 Finally, financial innovations, which are the motor of modern finance, lead to the 
formation of ultra-technical markets where only the inventors really understand the rules of 
the game. Getting beyond this stage of extreme technicality would be a means of containing 
the “domination regime” based on the increasing value of change (Boltanski, 2009: 203) and 
the exploitation of innovations.  
One aspect to be addressed urgently would be how to put a brake on “the 
uncontrollable dynamic of financial innovation which multiplies products of an incredible 
complexity and where it is impossible to measure the risk” (Lordon, 2008: 171), so that the 
fight against hyper-instrumentalisation denounced by Thrift (2006: 298) can preserve the 
common good and the affirmation of the civic world. 
 
Conclusion 
In our analysis we have tried to lift the veil on the singular nature of modern financial 
markets. The opposition between the projective city and other communities, shown by 
Boltanski and Chiapello (1999/2005), reinforces our thesis that OTC markets respond to a 
connexionist logic and a value system favouring the extension of networks and innovation. 
The projective city values collective creativity where there is collaboration, encouraged by the 
number and quality of the links made with others. Financial innovation has no recognised 
creator. It is the product of teams and its vocation is to be widespread and to be enhanced. It 
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would be unwelcome for an individual to claim authorship or to seek to obtain ownership 
rights. Unlike the industrial community and its rational bureaucracy, the projective city 
assumes flexible working methods, adaptation to changing needs, and the self-organisation of 
agents. This is reflected in trading rooms that are organised very differently from other 
centres of activity in the banks to which they belong. Even more specifically, connexionist 
logic and project-based community characterise a system that is opposed to the market world 
in at least three ways. While commercial exchanges are sporadic, economic exchanges in the 
connexionist world are relative long-term nature. Secondly, while the efficiency of markets in 
the market world requires transparency, so that competition can be played out freely, 
networks are only known, only to those close to them. Organised markets quote prices in a 
continuous fashion; on OTC markets, nobody except the parties concerned knows either the 
global worth or cost of transactions. The final contrast between the market world and the 
projective city is the qualification of traded products. The product exchanged is detached from 
the market world and does not travel well outside the projective city. It is transformed by the 
relationship between buyers and sellers that characterises the financial products of OTC 
markets. Products are “tailor made” to meet their buyers’ needs, unlike financial products on 
organised markets. 
The analysis in connexionist terms has also allowed us to think again about the 
challenges posed by the financial system and to identify dysfunctions whose underlying 
mechanisms were difficult to perceive. If the forms of the OTC market have created 
numerous innovations, they have created an equal number of problems. We have shown that 
the permanent innovation that drives the financial worlds has allowed dominant agents, who 
have the capacity to invent, to create profitable instruments and to capture a large part of their 
power and value. Their opportunism is difficult to contain in the open, globalised networks 
where the usual regulations (Abolafia, 1996) and normalisation are considerably weakened. 
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The structural dualism we have highlighted between those who draw up the norms – the 
immobile or “small” players, unworthy persons in the connexionist world – and those who 
play on the ambiguity, move around and get around the rules, condemn control devices to 
uselessness. To this difficulty must be added the absence of product traceability and 
increasing sophistication, which makes the chain of responsibility more and more diffuse in 
opaque networks that are only knowable from one person to another. 
Faced with these challenges we have tried to “adjust” the critique. If it is centred 
around the idea of the extreme mobility of capitals via these modern financial instruments, 
with consequences that can be immense for individuals and for states (Bryan and Rafferty, 
2006), it cannot account, with precision, for the particular nature of OTC markets and the 
operating profits at work. By exposing the dysfunctions created by the connexionist logic we 
have been able to suggest some paths for thought and action to tackle these problems. Should 
we build a “projective city” by rethinking, for example, international regulation and building 
new laws? Current developments lead us to doubt an awakening of conscience among the 
actors in the connexionist world and their capacity to self-regulate spontaneously. A return to 
the “market world” cannot be entertained either, except at the cost of raising a radical 
contradiction to the intrinsic dynamics of modern financial markets. 
So we are left with the coercive solution, which is to say resolving disputes in the 
heart of the civic world by encouraging the partitioning of financial markets, banning certain 
products and promoting de-sophistication (Lordon, 2008). The race for innovation and the 
growing complexity of modern financial products block out reality and stifle the emergence 
of a public debate. The increasing technicality of derivative products pushes the financially 
uninitiated further and further from any democratic decision making. As Boltanski said (2009: 
200) “the often technical character of statements and the measures taken makes it difficult or 
even useless to transmit them to the public at large.” This exaggerated complexity and hyper-
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sophistication, intended to create pockets of profit, disarms critics in that it relates to an 
unquestionable and necessary technical reality. However, the structures of finance need not be 
the exclusive preserve of experts. Understanding them is a political process that would lead to 
thinking about “final results” and would engage all citizens. This involves rejecting the 
appropriation that expert knowledge implies and reassigning the presupposed places of 
financiers and others (Rancière, 1998). In this context Castells speaks of developing a society 
based on values rather than the technico-economic deployment that characterises the 
domination of a networked society. Re-politicising the world of finance (De Goede, 2004) 
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Table 1: Principal differences between the market and the connexionist world  
 Market world Connexionist world 
 OTC Markets 
Time - Isolated transactions  
- Brief encounters between 
sellers and buyers 
- Long term transactions  
- Long term cooperation between 
sellers and buyers  
Transparency - Transparency as the ideal to 
pursue  
- Opacity surrounding the sums 
concerned and the price of 
transactions 
Agents - Anonymity 
- Atomicity 
- Great number of agents 
- Open network, only knowable, from 
one agent to the next  
- De-spatialisation 
Product - Objective definition  
- Homogeneity 









                                                
i Normally derivatives are accounted either by reference to notional totals or by reference to the volume of deals. 
The only complete data from the BIS being in notional totals, that is the measure used here. It does tend to 
exaggerate the size of markets. An approximate measure from the volume of trades would yield about 22% for 
standardized markets and 78% for OTC markets. 
ii See also Sassen (2005): “the drive to produce innovations is one of the marking features of the financial era 
that begins in the 1980s (…) what is perhaps different today is the intensification.” 
iii Resorting to forms of collaboration between competing organisations to promote an emerging market is not 
restricted to OTC markets (MacKenzie and Millo, 2003). On the other hand, the need to perpetuate these 
collaborations over a lengthy period seems characteristic of markets where the absence of product 
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standardisation maintains ambiguities. Promoters of these products have to tackle these ambiguities from time to 
time during the market lifetime.  
